The Hundred Years' War on Palestine (Rashid Khalidi)

Rashid Khalidi’s The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine (A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance) frames the conflict through six turning points, or ‘declarations of war’ upon the Palestinian people using a linear structure which makes the ripples between each section clear, and certainly make the current waves (or tsunami) more chilling.

Disclaimer: for anyone interested, I have no direct link to either Palestine or Israel, to Zionism or Judaism or Islam. My main connection to what we might term “the protagonists” of this conflict is simply that we are all human-beings. Writing, reflecting, or even discussing this particular conflict is made even more challenging with the choice of words – not only are we using terms such as Zionism, Judaism, or Islam, but we speak of Palestinians and Israelis, Europeans and Arabs, about a conflict and a war and a genocide and an ethnic cleansing, we speak of the Shoa and the Nakba, we use terms such as apartheid and war crimes, settler-colonialism, terrorism and freedom fighters and self-defence, The West, the Global South, oppressor and oppressed, inheritance and ownership and theft, trauma, ancestral rights, God-ordained, and so on so forth until the words are used so often that time is spent defining them or they begin to lose meaning or impact.

Khalidi's text contains elements of biography, with references to his time in Lebanon and Jerusalem during times of conflict and occupation, as well as his involvement in peace talks. He introduces the text through one of his ancestors, Yusuf Diya, an “heir to a long line of Jerusalemite Islamic scholars and legal functionaries” who had direct correspondence with Theodore Herzl.

Herzl, as we know, is the visionary of Zionism (please see previous reflections on Avi Shlaim's The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World). Khalidi writes that Zionism was a “response to Christian Europe’s virulent anti-semitism” and that Herzl himself, when considering the struggle to capture the land of Palestine, uses language such as “expropriate.” Herzl also recommended spiriting away the population, denying them employment, of being discrete and circumspect. The Zionist undertaking to “reclaim” the land of Palestine, then, was a criminal undertaking from its inception. It took place during the colonial age, and can be considered colonial in nature through to this day. It is important, however, not to dismiss the very real dangers and difficulties experienced by the Jewish people in Europe at that time.

In Khalidi’s introduction he considers the correspondence between Yusuf Diya and Theodore Herzl, noting that Herzl employed “a justification that would become a touchstone for colonialists at all times,” namely that “Jewish immigration would benefit the indigenous people of Palestine.” We know that this argument was a kind of cover for the central aims of the Zionist project, with Herzl grasping “the importance of disappearing the native population of Palestine in order for Zionism to succeed.”

Khalidi also makes reference to the attitude of Herzl towards Palestinians (which was the same as other Zionist goliaths towards the Arab world in general):

“This condescending attitude toward the intelligence, not to speak of the rights, of the Arab population of Palestine was to be serially repeated by Zionist, British, European and American leaders in the decades that followed, down to the present day.”

Khalidi is clear to assert the “essentially colonial nature of the century-long conflict in Palestine.” We often hear that this conflict is complex, too overwhelming to discuss, that there are so many factors at play that we are left with impassable and intractable positions; but we can also apply an Occam’s razor approach to this conflict and simply identify Zionism as a colonial project. Whilst there are many factors that can be debated and weighed, there is overwhelming evidence that supports using this as the starting point for all which follows.

After World War 1 there was a large-scale immigration of European Jewish settlers into Palestine which was supported by the British Mandate. In turn, there was a “crushing rebellion” of the 1936-39 Arab Revolt against British rule. Khalidi notes that the actions taken by Zionists and British alike was a “radical social engineering” which was “at the expense of the indigenous population […] the way of all colonial settler movements.”

“The modern history of Palestine can best be understood in these terms: as a colonial war waged against the indigenous population, by a variety of parties, to force them to relinquish their homeland to another people against their will.”

This framing may seem to be undeniable given what we know, but one major difficulty we currently have (as a species) is that discourses are shaped by power structures within states which, with Palestine in mind specifically, are largely allied to the Zionist project.

Herzl’s “condescending rhetoric” also extended to creating binary oppositions and an Orientalist mindset such as proposing that a Jewish state would “form a part of a wall of defence for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism.” Again, we would like to think that the mindset of humanity has shifted away from this, but we are still largely controlled (or influenced) by tactics of division. We could say, however, that with more connectedness and sharing of information the sway of the influence does feel less powerful – the grasp loosens, but will this result in a more brutal tightening?

Khalidi references another Zionist goliath, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, whose views (and influence upon the Israeli leadership) are closely examined in Shlaim’s The Iron Wall. He is described as the “godfather of the political trend that he dominated Israel since 1977, upheld by Prime Ministers Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu”.

Addressing the idea that Palestine was a kind of terra nullius at the time that Zionism was created, Khalidi notes that “socially, Palestine was still heavily rural with a predominantly patriarchal, hierarchical nature […] dominated by narrow urban elites drawn from a few families like my own.” This was encompassed within the Ottoman Empire, and there was a sharp shift in sense of identity when this entity suddenly disintegrated. Certain factors enabled consideration of the evolution of Palestinian society, such as access to education, availability of printed texts, ideas of nationhood, of social organisation, working-class solidarity, and the role of women in society. As a corollary to this, Khalidi observes that the “rapid pace” of transformation in Western Europe and North America during the modern industrial era led many outside observers to claim or think of Middle Eastern societies as stagnant or in decline. It’s all in the perception of things, in other words, and we can say that the colonial perception of the world (and the peoples within it) was deeply flawed.

Khalidi spends some time considering the Ottoman Empire and the impact of its fall. He notes that the empire sustained heavy losses during the First World War: 15% of its total population, or 3 million people.

“By the end of the fighting, people in Palestine and in much of the Arab world found themselves under occupation by European armies. After 400 years, they were confronted by the disconcerting prospect of alien rule and the swift disappearance of Ottoman control, which had been the only system of government known for twenty generations.”

In this power vacuum, the Zionist organisation were quick to respond and to maintain their organisation (with the support of the British). The Balfour Declaration promised the “non-Jewish communities” (that is, some 94% of the population) only “civil and religious rights”, not political or national rights. The British Empire, Khalidi asserts, was “never motivated by altruism”, but instead the control of Palestine for geopolitical strategic reasons. In 1922, three prominent British statesmen (Lloyd George, Lord Balfour, and Winston Churchill) reassured and convinced Zionist goliath Chaim Weizmann that they would never allow a representative government in Palestine. For all the talk of missed opportunities, or of the Palestinians “never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity”, we can look at the available evidence and primary sources of information and say that the sincerity of the British and Zionist powers towards the Palestinian people and leaders during this period was entirely questionable.

One assertion often made by apologists for Israel is that there was no Palestinian people or sense of national consciousness before 1947 (or even later). Furthermore, there is an attempt to erase the Palestinians both in a literal sense (through the physical actions of Israel against the Palestinians) but also in a more ephemeral sense by dismissing any idea of “Palestine” or “Palestinian”. Khalidi notes that “Palestinian identity, much like Zionism, emerged in response to many stimuli” at the same time as modern, political Zionism. The threat of Zionism was one factor in this, but we can also refer to a love for country, a desire to improve society, religious attachment, and opposition to European control.

The Palestinians began to more formally organise following World War 1, with Khalidi noting that the “Palestinian leadership pursued this fruitless legalistic approach for over a decade and a half”, but the British were simply not listening to them. In other words there existed a Palestinian identity prior to the creation of Israel and this was in part formed during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in much the same way as other Middle-Eastern nation-states. We can say that all national identity is an invented and imagined thing because nation-states in essence are invented and imagined things (though this does not lessen the importance of such identities). Israel is of course welcome to national identity also, though the means by which this is established should be open to close scrutiny and, where necessary, criticism.

Palestinian dissatisfaction and disaffectedness led to demonstrations, strikes and riots. Their sense of self was uneven, and their route to recourse (or resolution) was also somewhat divided, with some considering the option of securing independence as part of a wider Arab state.

“Arabism and a sense of belonging to the larger Arab world always remained strong, but Palestinian identity was constantly reinforced by Britain’s bias in favour of the burgeoning Zionist project.”

This is an additional point to make that we had not seen in Shlaim's The Iron Wall. Palestinians may take issue with being classified or boxed-in as 'Arab' in much the same way that it would be an error to equate Palestine to Islam, Israel to Judaism, or Japan to Shintoism.

Within a decade after World War 1, the Turkish, Iranians, Syrians, Egyptians and Iraqis all achieved a “measure of independence”, whereas the League of Nations’ Mandate for Palestine (1922) gave rights only to the Zionist settlers. This, in effect, wiped out the entire history of Palestine, and set a precedent for ignoring the Palestinians. Their historical connection to the land was denied, and by extension the people were themselves denied an existence.

“The British” writes Khalidi, “treated the Palestinians with the same contemptuous condescension” as they did their other colonies, such as Hong Kong and Jamaica. British officials monopolised official offices, they censored newspapers, and (at times) banned political activities. They prevented the education of the people, and the racist attitudes of the colonial officials is well-documented. Khalidi writes that the colonial practices that Britain had developed over the preceding centuries reached their “peak perfection” in Palestine, specifically the sophisticated policy of divide and rule which Britain had deployed in Ireland, India, and Egypt.

Nevertheless, Jewish immigration to Palestine stagnated, and the Zionists expressed concerns that they would not reach the “critical mass” needed to tip the scales in their favour. Then Hitler came into power which in turn led to an even more pronounced mistreatment of the Jewish people in Europe. At the same time we had “native unrest” in Palestine, the frustration of the Palestinian people at their own leadership’s ineffective response to the ongoing storm, which in turn led to strikes and revolts. There was an armed suppression, the Peel Commission recommended a partition of the land, and a British district commissioner was assassinated. In turn, the Mandate Authority deported virtually the entirety of the Palestinian nationalist leadership.

Differences arose within this leadership: some wanted a conciliatory approach, a compromise to accept partition (such as attachment to Transjordan), whilst others did not want any compromise. In 1939, war loomed over Europe, and Khalidi notes that Britain needed to shift its approach in order to improve its image in the Arab countries. Chamberlain’s government issued a White Paper proposing severe curtailment of British commitments to the Zionist movement. The Palestinian leadership, for their part, doubted the sincerity of this (understandably so, we can say), with Husayn al-Khalidi believing that this was to “gain time, and to drug the Arabs”. Regardless, soon after this Winston Churchill came into power. Khalidi describes him as “the most ardent Zionist in British public life.”

Alongside the political support that Zionism received from powers such as Britain (and, to this day, the USA), there is also the hand-in-hand armed support received from Britain (and, to this day, the USA). Jabotinsky, the titanic Goliath and “godfather” of the Zionist right, whose profile and views are examined in Shlaim's The Iron Wall (and who, it is asserted, serves as the prophet of the Israeli right, including Netanyahu) wrote that “Zionism is a colonising venture and, therefore, it stands or falls on the question of armed forces.” To repeat, one of the key members of early Zionism who remains an inspiration for Israeli politial leaders today described the undertaking as a "colonising venture".

Khalidi refers to the Mandatory authorities’ “collusion” with the Jewish Agency, stating that “there is a consensus among objective historians that this collusion, supported by the League of Nations, severely undermined any possibility of success for the Palestinians’ struggle for the representative institutions, self-determination, and independence they believed were their right.” Whenever we hear of missed opportunities, or of Palestinians rejecting certain proposals, or even of armed struggle, it is important to note that from the outset the Palestinian people were bypassed within the framework of the political authority. What more could then have done for self-advocacy?

In addition, the Palestinians were “facing the well-developed para-state of the Jewish Agency without having a central state themselves” and this “proved to be a fatal weakness militarily, financially, and diplomatically.”

Where was the neighbouring support against this strange tide? We hear today, even, complaints and criticisms aimed at neighbouring Arab states, that they should be supporting the Palestinian people by offering them refuge and so on. In 1945, six Arab states formed the Arab League, and yet there was no reference to Palestine in its inaugural communique, with Khalidi hinting that the British sway over each of them was a factor in this. It is also noted that these states (Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon) were all “frail and fraught with rancorous disunity.” The newly created Zionist state had its roots in Europe and, as a result, the leadership had a “sophisticated grasp” of the European and Western way of doing things.

The Second World War had a significant impact on Britain’s standing in the world: “Reeling from deep postwar economic and financial problems and the unwinding of the centuries-old Indian Raj, Great Britain finally capitulated in Palestine” and handed over the authority to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Khalidi notes that UN Resolution 181 was another declaration of war, as this “provided the international birth certificate” for Israel, and yet the Palestinians were (again) overlooked and bypassed. This was, Khalidi writes, a violation of the principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. He also notes that Britain actually abstained in the partition vote as it did not want to further alienate the Arab states.

Khalidi turns to address the ethnic cleansing that took place in Palestine following the Resolution 181. He notes, however, that this process began well before Israel was vomited into being, and he describes scenes of flight, people fleeing as news of massacres spread. There were forced expulsions as well as panicked departures (some 300,000 people), and devastation of the Arab majority’s key urban economic, political, civic and cultural centres. The second phase of the expulsion followed the victory of the new Israeli army against the Arab armies (a further 400,000 expelled and fled). And so the transformation of Palestine from an "Arab majority" was through both systematic ethnic cleansing and the theft of land and property. Both of these things, it could be argued, are unkind, and if it were to happen to a person or group of peoples we might expect them to feel aggrieved and a little annoyed.

The once mighty empire of Great Britain began to become “eclipse[d]” on the world stage, replaced by the duelling war monsters of the USA and USSR. Both of these powers initially supported Israel, but for much different reasons: the USSR assumed that Israel would be a kind of socialist protege, but Israel chose neutrality for the Korean War and moved closer to the USA who, for their part, militarily (that is in the eyes of the Pentagon), viewed Israel as a potentially powerful ally in the region. Khalidi notes, however, that Israel did not receive the massive levels of military and economic support from the USA until the 1970s.

The nakba, Khalidi writes, was a profound social trauma, with destitution, loss, and “abrupt collective disruption.” And yet despite this, a significant resilience was displayed alongside the support of agencies such as The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) whose provision of services in Lebanon and elsewhere (notably universal education and vocational training), “enabled Palestinians to become among the most highly educated people in the Arab world.” Khalidi outlines some of the ways in which Palestinian refugees were integrated into other Arab states, and how they contributed positively. This was later to be exploited and challenged by Israel.

With regards the Arab states, Khalidi notes that the military defeat of 1948 made them “deeply fearful of Israel, whose powerful army continued to launch devastating strikes as part of disproportionate reprisals for refugee incursions, aimed at forcing Arab governments to crack down on Palestinian irredentism.” In other words, Israel’s Iron Wall approach, and its incredibly harsh approach to its Arab neighbours, was in part intended to break the Palestinian people. Their actions were often condemned by the UN, as they are today, almost overwhelmingly, save for the USA and what some term its "proxies".

Following this we have what Khalidi describes as a “peculiar situation” amongst Arab leaders whereby they raised the issues of the “Palestinian problem” but refrained from acting as they were fearful of Israel and the disapproval of the great powers. Palestine therefore became a “political football,” and the Palestinians, “witnessing this cynical game eventually realised that if anything was to be done about their cause, they would have to do it themselves.”

Despite all evidence to the contrary, Khalidi writes that the “myth prevails” that Israel is a “tiny, vulnerable country” facing “constant, existential peril.” At the end of the Suez Crisis (or Tripartite Agreement/Aggression), Israel conducted a series of massacres in Gaza, which Khalidi notes is a “pattern of behaviour in the Israeli military […] news of the massacres was suppressed in Israel and veiled by a complaisant American media.” We will see how, over time, the suppression becomes more difficult for Israel and the USA to enforce. On Gaza, Khalidi references French historian Jean-Pierre Filiu who chronicles a total of twelve major Israeli military campaigns against Gaza, going back to 1948. Some of these were “full—fledged occupations and some constitute all-out warfare.” Current events are yet to be formally classified, but we do at this time have the International Criminal Court advising that there could plausibly be a genocide taking place. (Note: this was originally written in early 2024 - the evidence for this past year of horror being a genocide is now considerable, despite a recent 'ceasefire'.)

Khalidi references Malcolm Kerr describing the “height of the Arab Cold War” when Egypt led a coalition of radical Arab nationalist regimes opposed to the conservative bloc led by Saudi Arabia. Or, in another way, authoritarian Arab nationalism versus political Islam, which was centred on Wahhabism and absolute monarchy. Today, some view the Middle East as being in a new Cold War between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In any case, Israel’s presence since 1948 in the age of postcolonialism has added a new dimension to the region, one in which Khalidi notes is a kind of new “axis,” with Israel’s army on the ground, and “diplomatic cover” being provided by the USA.

Israel’s external alliance shifted away from Great Britain and France towards the new great world power: The United State of America. For the Six Day War, they “sought and received a green light from Washington to launch a pre-emptive attack on the air forces of Egypt, Syrian, and Jordan”. Following this, Security Council Resolution 242 treated the peace talks as state-to-state, thereby eliminating the Palestinians (once again).

Khalidi notes how there has been a discursive battle over Palestine “which Zionism had dominated since 1897” in terms of the process of naming, or claiming, or defining. He notes that Golda Meir (Prime Minister of Israel from 1969 to 1974) took “the negation characteristic of a settler-colonial project to the highest possible level: the indigenous people were nothing but a lie.” The acts being committed against Palestinians by Israel and its backers are abhorrent, but to deny that Palestinians even exist seems especially perverse. In doing so, “a whole new layer of forgetting, of erasure and myth-making, was added to the induced amnesia that obscured the colonial origins of the conflict between Palestinians and the Zionist settlers.”

Current events appear to indicate that Israel would like a final solution to the “Palestine problem,” at least in Gaza. The difficulty they have is whether the world will be able to forget these actions, or forget the Palestinians. It seems doubtful. Indeed, Ahmad Samih Khalidi observes that “a central paradox of 1967 is that by defeating the Arabs, Israel resurrected the Palestinians”. Perhaps Israel’s current actions against the Palestinians will backfire on them even more astoundingly, especially with the overwhelming evidence of the acts themselves. Surely there is only so much control over narrative a power can exert before the premises on which society is built begin to spark, with rules and order quickly catching fire?

Perhaps their approach will be for some kind of recognition of their crimes through show trials, or a mock regime change. I expect that the path taken will be to try and control the narrative, but it feels like we are living in a time, more than ever, where that is no longer possible – there are always pockets of resistance, and there is enough dissatisfaction and disaffectedness in western lands for trust in the system to shatter, though how far this extends to wider issues remains to be seen. With regards Security Council Resolution 242, Khalidi notes that although much was left unresolved, this has become the benchmark for all attempts to resolve the situation.

At this time, hard-line Zionists believed that if Palestine “existed” Israel could not. They began to connect and equate Palestine with “terrorism and hatred” rather than as a “forgotten but just cause”. Khalidi argues that the PLO should have invested more energy and resources in the “arenas” of the USA and Israel in order to change public opinion. Instead, their actions could be said to have perpetuated the myth-making of the Zionists. We could also say that they were goaded into conflict and action, as “scores of Palestinian leaders and cadres […] fell victim to the assassination squads of the Mossad,” and that “assassinations were thus a central element in Israel’s ambition to transform the entire country, from the river to the sea, from an Arab one to a Jewish one.”

Khalidi notes that Prime Ministers Shamir, Sharon, and Netanyahu were all “ideological heirs of Ze’ev Jabotinsky” believing that the “entirety of Palestine belonged to the Jewish people, and that a Palestinian people with national rights did not exist.” With this in mind, it is no wonder that certain negotiations failed, or that certain measures have been taken against the Palestinians, or that the intentions of the Israeli army appear to be to remove as many Palestinian people and infrastructure as possible: the final solution for Israel has always been to claim and cleanse the whole land, a necessary (at least in their eyes) step being to remove the indigenous people.

In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon. This was a particular “watershed” moment in this conflict as it was the first time since 1948 to involve mainly Palestinians (fighting Israel on its own behalf, as it were). The Israeli objective was to destroy the PLO and eliminate its power base in Lebanon to “put an end to the strength of the Palestinian nationalism in the occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.” Khalidi was present in Lebanon at this time with his family and he notes, with unsettling description, the indiscriminate bombing campaign, “the only possible objective of such blanket bombardment was to terrorise the population of Beirut and turn it against the PLO.” Indeed, Khalidi notes that Lebanese citizens themselves were resentful towards the PLO due to their “heavy-handed and often arrogant behaviour.” He also acknowledges that the PLO’s assaults in Israel were “often directed at civilian targets and visibly did little to advance the Palestinian national cause.”

The Israeli leadership, notably Begin and Sharon, had convinced President Reagan and his administration that the PLO was a “terrorist group aligned with the evil Soviet empire”. The actions of the PLO against civilian targets supported this assertion. Eventually, the PLO agreed to leave Lebanon under certain assurances from the USA, including for the protection of non-combatants. But Israeli forces soon entered and occupied the western part of Beirut, and there was a significant massacre conducted by Lebanese militiamen, who entered a refugee camp and slaughtered defenceless civilians (more than 1,300 Palestinian and Lebanese men, women, and children). This event is in some way captured in the film Waltz with Bashir, which, some argue, is an instance of Israeli guilt manifested through “shooting and crying” - in other words showing some remorse after committing horrific events as a way of absolving guilt. The question remains as to how sincere these tears are. Khalidi’s description of this night is especially haunting:

“On […] September 16, Raja and I were perplexed as we watched a surreal scene: Israeli flares floating down in the darkness in complete silence, one after another, over the southern reaches of Beirut, for what seemed like an eternity. As we saw the flares descend, we were baffled: armies normally use flares to illuminate a battlefield, but the cease-fire had been signed a month earlier, all the Palestinian fighters had left weeks ago, and any meagre Lebanese resistance to the Israeli troops’ arrival in West Beirut had ended the previous day. We could hear no explosions and no shooting. The city was quiet and fearful.”

Note: writing on the 26th January 2025, following a recent cease-fire agreement, this passage is a dull thud and a reminder that cease-fire agreements are easily broken.

A commission of inquiry was arranged after the events, and Khalidi notes that there is evidence of “long-deliberated decisions” by Sharon and others to commit the slaughter, with American diplomats “browbeaten”, and false assertions levelled by Begin, Shamir and Sharon about Palestinians fighters and weaponry being present. What we see here is a distinct pattern being played out by Israel since its creation: insincerity, false assertions, abusive and controlling behaviour towards their peers, and gruesome acts committed against civilians (including, most especially and with a perverse intent, children).

Khalidi makes some further important distinctions regarding the 1982 invasion:

• It was a “joint Israeli-US military endeavour”. This is particularly important as we move into the present day as we must consider how culpable those who support Israel are.
• We learn that a consequence of the invasion of Lebanon was the rise of Hezbollah. Again, this is a case of Israeli aggressions ultimately backfiring, or creating an even greater threat.
• This was “Israel’s first and only attempt at forcible regime change in the Arab world.”

In addition, with regards as to what the world saw of Israel’s actions (including the massacre), and as an interesting corollary for today:

“no amount of sophisticated propaganda by Israel and its supporters sufficed to erase these indelible images, and as a result, Israel’s standing in the world was severely tarnished.”

How much has the present-day Israeli leadership weighed-up and considered the international scene? Has it decided that it would simply extend its cruel actions to the furthest possible extent? We learn that in response to the Qibya Massacre, prominent Zionist leaders felt that the only thing that mattered was how the Arab world perceived Israel. Perhaps following 1982 and the decades following, Israeli leadership has been of the position that the only thing that matters is that the world recognises that Israel is prepared to go to any length to secure the whole land of Palestine?

Another consequence following 1982 was that the centre of gravity for the Palestinian national movement shifted back into the occupied territories (rather than in external Arab states). This, in turn, led to more grassroot movements, and led specifically to the First Intifada. This had a further destabilising effect on Israeli propaganda as there was a “major media backlash”. This was a constant drain on Israel, significantly so with regards to its reputation in the world, which, Khalidi states, is “in some ways its most vital asset.” I think we can unequivocally say that its reputation as we write towards the end of March 2024 is significantly damaged to the extent where even some biased and compromised parties and figures are clearly indicating that Israeli actions against Palestinians have gone too far.

The First Intifada was led by a generation of Palestinians who “had known nothing but military occupation.” This is worth examining in terms of understanding the mindset and motivations of the people who are living under occupation. There is only so much I can write or assert as an outside observer, and I certainly can’t speak for the oppressed peoples. In this sense, then, it is worthwhile to ask ourselves what our mindset, motivations and responses might be if we had been born into such a situation...

Similarly, we can say the same of the Jewish people who had experienced suffering and torment. Khalidi notes that Eqbal Ahmad, who had worked with the Front de Liberation Nationale in Algeria in the 1960s, visited PLO bases and critiqued them: “he questioned whether armed struggle was the right course of action against […] Israel. He argued that given the course of Jewish history, especially in the twentieth century, the use of force only strengthened a pre-existing and pervasive sense of victimhood among Israelis, while it unified Israeli society, reinforced the most militant tendencies in Zionism, and bolstered the support of external actors.” We can extend this further and try to get into the mindset of the Israeli general population today, most of whom were born after Israel had been created, and who (broadly speaking) did not choose to be occupiers of a land. How might they process current events or the recent history of the land?

During the Gulf War, Arafat chose to align with Iraq, which Khalidi states was an “epic miscalculation” which isolated the Palestinian community in Kuwait and ostracised the PLO within the Arab and Gulf states. At this point, the Palestinians were “more friendless and alone than perhaps at any stage in history”. Khalidi is particularly critical of Arafat and the PLO throughout the text. This includes observations of their negotiations with Rabin and their obtaining recognition from their oppressors without achieving liberation. This was a “resounding, historic mistake, one with grave consequences for the Palestinian people.” This deal led to a “highly restricted form of self-rule in a fragment of the Occupied Territories, and without control of land, water, borders, or much else.” The Oslo Accords were a “straightjacket”, with the “architecture of negotiations” described as “devious.”

Khalidi writes that in the “decades following 1993, the strip was cut off from the rest of the world in stages, encircled by troops on land and the Israeli navy by sea.” Imprisoned, with diplomatic measures and attempts leading time and again to less freedoms, less movement towards peace, it is no wonder that the communication of some of the Palestinian people became more desperate. We have learned in other reflections that Hamas (a word with many associations today) gained power and felt that “only the use of force could lead to the liberation of Palestine […] reasserting the claim to the entirety of Palestine.” Khalidi also attributes the rise of Hamas as a more general response to secular nationalist ideologies in the Middle East.

The Second Intifada included attacks on Israeli “soil”, or within the territory of the enemy. This was, Khalidi argues, another “major setback” for the Palestinian national movement as it affected (or “erase[d]”) the positive image of Palestinians that had evolved since 1982. Following the attacks on October 7^th 2023, the Israeli propaganda machine within the UK and elsewhere painted a picture of terrorism, trying to sell the public a narrative of mass rape and babies being put into ovens. The lies could only last so long, though, and the sharing of information meant that the lies could be countered whilst the truth of Israel’s actions (including that of killing its own civilians) could be shared. This has led, in particular, to a further distrust in many people towards the western media sector itself.

The suicide attacks (of the Second Intifada), were portrayed as “blind revenge”. In turn they united and strengthened the adversary (Israel), while weakening and dividing the Palestinian side. In our current context, it could argued that the opposite appears to have happened, though the consequences in Gaza have been devastating enough to constitute a plausible case of genocide.

Israel responded with a series of “targeted killings” of Palestinian leadership groups (such as Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad), and an ongoing war against Gaza, which included “major Israeli ground offensives in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014” as well as regular military incursions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. There were arrests and detentions, the demolition of homes, the suppression of the population and, Khalidi asserts, the “quiet collusion of the Fatah-run PA.” He is as critical of them as he was of Arafat and the PLO.

In 2006, Hamas decided to run in parliamentary elections. Against all expectations it won. Khalidi notes that this reflected voters’ great desire for change in the Occupied Territories. In May of that year, five leaders of the major groups held in Israeli prisons issued the so-called Prisoners’ Document, which called for the end of the rupture between factions, and for a two-state solution. They tried to form a coalition government but faced opposition from the USA and Israel (in the form of, not least, boycotts). The demonisation of the PLO, Khalidi writes, was now repeated with Hamas, who were labelled as terrorists even in light of the ongoing Israeli terror.

In turn, the USA backed a coup (you don’t hear that one often), but this failed. Israel responded with a “full-blown siege” on Gaza; a siege, that is, on an already occupied territory. Goods entering into Gaza were significantly reduced, and exports stopped. Fuel supplies were cut. This was, Khalidi writes, “a new declaration of war” which “also provided the indispensable international cover for the open warfare that was to come.” This includes three “savage” air and ground assaults that consisted of an “extreme disproportionality of this one-sided war.”

At this point Khalidi also makes reference to the Dahiya Doctrine, an Israeli military “strategy” which outlines the use of disproportionate force, viewing targets as military bases rather than civilian villages or infrastructure. There is a kind of twisted logic at play here in which the goal (the total destruction of the perceived enemy) can be given license by removing the idea of civilians and classing each member of the perceived enemy as a combatant (or each piece of infrastructure, including, say, a hospital, as a military base). In this way we hear of Israeli political leaders (and citizens) refer to Palestinian children and babies as 'infrastructure'.

With regards to US and other Western powers, Khalidi argues that their relative “silence” may be a “product of legal advice to avoid liability and potential prosecution for war crimes.” At this point he also takes up the discussion of legitimate self-defence, asking if Hamas’ rockets are war crimes, what then of Israeli actions? This whole discussion of culpability, accountability, complicity, not to mention the classification of war crimes is likely to be explored in depth as we move forward and current events move towards an end point.

Khalidi also takes time to consider the US position. He wonders if there has been a shift in overall American public opinion, albeit with little change in overall policy. This may certainly be evident today in the amount of demonstrations taking place at college campuses (extending to other nations also), and the seeming inertia of the so-called liberal class to show any kind of compassion or honesty towards the apparent genocide. The Republican base, Khalidi writes, and especially Evangelicals, have always been largely supportive of Israel’s hawkish policies. Democrats, in turn, have shifted right since the 1980s.

Ultimately the US, Khalidi believes (though it would be interesting to hear his opinion today) acts in its own interests first and foremost, meaning that they would not follow and support Israeli actions to insane ends. But what of US interests in the Middle East? Their “permissive attitude” towards Israeli/Zionist terror would surely turn the Middle East against them? This isn’t the case, Khalidi believes, because the Middle East is ruled by the “largest concentration of autocratic regimes of any region in the world”. The US has never supported the advancement of democracy in the Middle East, “preferring to deal with the dictatorship and absolute monarchies that control most countries.” In turn, Saudi Arabia’s monarchy is referred to by Khalidi as passive.

Khalidi argues that Britain, first, and then the USA have been “trying to do the impossible: impose a colonial reality on Palestine in a postcolonial age.” Perhaps this is why, despite the terror and bloodshed committed by Israel and its assets, the project has not achieved its ultimate aim. Part of this is the common sense of Humanity and impartial observers, not to mention the sacrifice of many heroes in the practical realm, such as aid workers (for example those within UNRWA), but also in the political realm, through judicial processes (for example barristers such as Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh).

Israel has one “great achievement” though, Khalidi writes: “the propagation” of an image of Israel as a “normal, natural nation state” which is “faced by irrational hostility of […] often anti-Semitic Muslims”. This framing is, he writes, “vital to its survival.” This may in part also explain the demonisation of Islam in western countries, the backdoor political activities of Israel in other nations such as the USA and the UK, not to mentioned Israeli intelligence services' operations in these nations. It may also explain the vital role that organisations such as ISIS have played to communicate and embed the idea that Islam = Evil and Dangerous into the minds and perceptions of the masses.

Khalidi writes that three approaches have “been effective in expanding the way in which the reality in Palestine is understood”:

1. Colonialism: This position, looking at the history of Zionism as well as comparisons to other colonial-settler experiences, whilst making sense to many, is “exceedingly hard given the Biblical dimension of Zionism” in which the Palestinians are viewed as undesirable interlopers. He observes that in the US, which is “steeped in evangelical Protestantism”, the word “colonial” is viewed much differently to much of the world, and the term “settler” is also viewed in a more positive light.
2. Imbalance of Power: Zionists present the conflict as the Israeli David versus the Muslim or Arab Goliath, or they maintain that attempts towards peace have often been rebuffed. The oppression and cruelty eventually undermines moral legitimacy. Modern Zionism, increasingly illiberal, becomes increasingly at odds with the ideas that Western democracies are supposed to be based on. A recent myth frames this conflict as two states contesting an even fight, with Israel constantly seeking peace only to be rebuffed by the Palestinians. The is far from an even conflict, to the extent that it is questionable whether we should even use a word such as 'war'.
3. Inequality: this refers to imbalance of power and, for Israel, the need for security. This is the “most promising” for expanding the reality because inequality was essential to the creation of Israel and because it is “anathema to the egalitarian, deomcratic societies” that Zionism/Israel has relied upon. This assumes, however, that nations such as the UK and the USA are indeed democratic or if they have not morphed into something different…

Khalidi further notes that there are “now two people in Palestine, irrespective or how they came into being” which displays some sympathy towards those Israelis who were born into the imposed system. He further writes that “mutual acceptance” must be based on “complete equality of rights.”

He then outlines some of the key difficulties caused by the Trump administration (with its very clear connections to the Israeli right). One instance of provocation was moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, but there were others, such as the recognition of the annexation of the Golan Heights, and trying to liquidate UNRWA. The administration “abandoned” any pretence of impartiality, generating draft proposals “that were so offensively pro-Israel to be unacceptable to even the most compliant Palestinians.”

At the time of Khalidi writing, he asserted that the existing strategies of Fatah and Hamas had “come to nothing.” There was still a dependence on US mediation, and armed struggle had not advanced Palestinian aims. In addition, not much was to be expected from Egypt or Jordan (who both moved closer to Israel/USA by signing massive gas deals with them), nor from Saudi Arabia or the UAE (who both purchased weapons from Israel through the USA).

For Khalidi, this necessitated “a careful consideration by the Palestinians of their methods”. He wrote that they needed unity, but also that they needed to realise that the diplomatic strategy deployed by the PLO since the 1980s had been “fatally flawed” in the sense that the USA could never be an able mediator or neutral party: the USA is simply too connected to Israel, not least (or perhaps especially so) in their political class.

Perhaps, Khalidi wrote, there should be more of an appeal to the non-aligned states, such as China, Brazil and so on. Furthermore, that Palestinians should “go over the heads” of the “subservient Arab leaders” to the people of the Arab countries, who are largely sympathetic to the Palestinians. Indeed, we can say that currently there has even been a significant shift in citizens of the western countries (those self-proclaimed democracies), and we can also look at the actions of states such as Yemen, who have largely rebuffed western powers in the Red Sea despite their own ongoing internal issues (at the hands of states such as Saudi Arabia, the USA and the UK).

Finally, Khalidi noted that any new negotiations must move the goalposts away from the formulas devised by Israel in the past. This includes past UN Resolutions and negotiations such as the Oslo Accords. The USA should be regarded as an extension of Israel, and in turn, there should be a challenge to the “half-century long US monopoly on peacemaking.”

We can say, perhaps, that this conflict has been made ever more intractable, ever more peverse and horrific, by the collaboation of the leading power (be it the British or the USA) with the Zionists. There is much talk (or at least I see some mention of this in certain spaces) of a multipolar world order, with the balance of power, as well as the framework of justice and equity, having a range of sites rather than a pyramid structure with the USA at the apex (as the apex predator). We can hope that if ever such a thing was to occur, that there would be a different approach to peace and diplomacy than the one taken by the USA over the past century.